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An important element in considering school finance policies is that households are not passive but
instead respond to policies. Household behavior is especially important in considering how households
affect the spatial structure of metropolitan areas where different jurisdictions incorporate bundles of
advantages and disadvantages.   This paper adds richness to existing urban models by incorporating
multiple workplace locations, alternative public services by jurisdiction (school qualities), and voter-
determined school expenditure.  In our general equilibrium model of residential location and community
choice, households base optimizing decisions on commuting costs, school quality, and land rents.
The resulting equilibrium has heterogeneous communities in terms of income and tastes for schools.
This basic model is used to analyze a series of conventional policy experiments, including school
district consolidation and district power utilization.  The important conclusion within our range of
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A unique feature of the U.S. education system is the high degree of both funding and control
granted to local governments. As a result, school choice is inextricably tied to residential location
decisions. This organization has been lauded for its responsiveness to individual demands and for
the potential of increased school accountability. On the other hand, it also introduces potential
inequities by tieing funding decisions to local ability to pay. These conﬂicting views have made
debates about school ﬁnancing a regular item on both legislative and judicial agendas.
The complexities of analyzing the interaction of location and schooling are well known.
When local citizens control taxing and spending decisions and when the quality of schools depends
on the peer group, school quality is an endogenous outcome that depends on aggregate individual
choices. With local funding of schools through a property tax, housing prices and the tax base also
become endogenous and potentially strongly inﬂuenced by any governmental policies that aﬀect
the funding formula. Finally, residential location, while potentially responsive to school quality, is
also strongly inﬂuenced by job location and journey to work.
With a few exceptions, analyses of school ﬁnance policies have generally ignored one or
more of these features of household choices of schools and homes. As a result, analysis of policy
alternatives for school ﬁnance and operations is likely to be severely distorted.
This paper integrates the essential features of schools and location. In a general equilibrium
framework, heterogeneous families (in terms of income and tastes) seek out an optimal residential
location and workplace based on commuting costs, wages, and school quality. They also vote
on local taxes, yielding variations in school spending that, along with peer inﬂuences, produce
variations in school quality. The general equilibrium aspects are especially important, because
housing prices vary with demand and with governmental policy.
This model is used to analyze the impacts of two alternative school ﬁnance policies designed
to increase the equity in schooling by reducing the reliance on local property taxes. First, district
power equalization – a commonly proposed remedy for unequal tax bases and varying school spend-
1ing – is put into the general equilibrium framework where families react to the altered locational
advantages. Second, district consolidation and full state funding for school districts are considered
from the perspectives of school outcomes and of individual welfare.
We ﬁnd that the resulting impacts of school policy are very diﬀerent than previously
thought. Relying on our parameterizations (and a variety of sensitivity analyses surrounding
these), both of these policies lead to reduced welfare for all households regardless of income or
taste for schooling. Full state funding does narrow educational disparities by incomes, but it does
so at the cost of lowered achievement for all students. Additionally, these policies set in motion a
series of adjustments that signiﬁcantly change housing rents and support for schools.
The next section places our work into the context of existing research. We then provide the
theoretical formulation for our basic model with decentralized employment, household demand for
schools, and governmental support for education through voter choices of taxes. This model is
calibrated for a benchmark case that provides the basis for evaluating the impact of signiﬁcant
changes in the ﬁnancing of schools. The policy changes, while within the range of observed
governmental decisions, are large enough that the general equilibrium nature of the problem cannot
be ignored – and indeed is the motivation for this work.
2 Existing Literature
Urban location and local public ﬁnance have been built on two artiﬁcially separated streams
of literature, namely urban residential location models and Tiebout models of community choice.
In urban location theory, a household’s residential location is determined by the trade-oﬀ between
accessibility and space. The pioneer of this approach was Alonso (1964) with his simple but
instructive model of the land market, modelling later followed by a great deal of theoretical and
empirical work by Muth (1969), Mills (1972), Kain (1975), and others. (See the reviews in
Straszheim (1987) and Fujita (1989)). These models are mainly concerned with how to model
residential choice where the driving force is workplace accessibility and commuting costs. By
ignoring local public goods and services, they do not address many policy questions, but they
2do provide baseline predictions about locational choices. The typical model predicts that higher
income people live in suburban areas, although Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (2008) suggest
that the observed behavior has more stratiﬁcation than can be supported by the models. Their
explanation focuses on public transportation, but they also ignore other public services including
schooling, as emphasized here.
In Tiebout models of community choice, on the other hand, households care (only) about
local public goods and vote with their feet to shop for the community which best satisﬁes their
preferences. This literature has evolved from the central insight of Tiebout (1956) and builds
upon the analytical framework developed in Ellickson (1971). The most inﬂuential studies from
this approach have been conducted by Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 1993), who have also
introduced politics into the model. (See also the additions by Epple and Romano (1998, 2003) and
the review by Ross and Yinger (1999)).This literature concludes that households will stratify into
communities by their income and tastes and that each community will attract a speciﬁc household
type. This is an important shortcoming of these models, given empirically that communities tend
to be quite heterogeneous in terms of income (see, for example, Pack and Pack 1977,1978).
Some prior work has addressed the problem of homogeneous communities in Tiebout mod-
els. Epple and Platt (1998) introduce households that diﬀer both by income and by tastes and
show that there is income heterogeneity within communities because of these preference diﬀerences.
In their model, they concentrate on residential location decisions where diﬀerent communities pro-
vide diﬀering amounts of local redistribution of income. Their results lead to an interpretation of
the resulting communities as a central city (with redistribution) and suburban locations (without
redistribution), but location (or accessibility) per se is not important.1
The urban location model and the Tiebout model have each attempted to abstract from
reality in order to concentrate on a speciﬁc feature of interest. However, the general conﬂicts
1 With a single community characteristic (the amount of local redistribution), the distribution of tastes yields
an equilibrium with communities that have a mixture of income, but the same type of individual (denominated by
income and taste) will only be found in a single community. As described below, when there are multiple motivations
for living in a community, the same type of household can be found in diﬀerent communities in equilibrium.
3with the gross empirical data are severe, suggesting that the models may not provide reliable
indications of the comparative statics and of how policy interacts with location. An innovative
paper by de Bartolome and Ross (2003) suggests that combining the two modelling perspectives
may provide a more realistic portrait of urban location. Their monocentric city model that includes
ﬁscal motivation of jurisdictions and majority voting can produce income mixing in a central city
and suburban ring, although households all consume a common amount of land – something in
conﬂict with standard urban location models. Nechyba (2000, 2003), taking a diﬀerent route,
develops a general equilibrium model that is calibrated on pre-existing heterogeneity of income and
housing. A review of alternative modelling approaches is provided by Epple and Nechyba (2004)
and Nechyba (2006).2
This paper builds on these various strands. The objective is construction of a model
with suﬃcient richness to capture the basic reality of urban spatial structure and the key elements
of governmental policy interventions.3 We build on our prior work that developed a general
equilibrium model of household location and school demand in a model with centralized employment
that has two competing school districts (Hanushek and Yilmaz 2007).4 That work suggests that
the interaction of accessibility and local public goods is indeed very important for understanding the
spatial structure of residential locations.5 But it falls short in two fundamental ways. First, it fails
2In a recent paper, Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) take a diﬀerent approach to merging location models and
Tiebout models. They consider equilibrium of households and housing suppliers in a metropolitan area and develop
a set of suﬃcient conditions that justify estimation of multi-community equilibrium models while ignoring intra-
community variation in amenities. Empirically they view each parcel as having a single amenity value that combines
travel times to the center of the city (Pittsburgh) and speciﬁc high school attendance zone.
3This analysis concentrates on the long run equilibrium for the residential location of households. As such it
ignores any of the short run dynamics or of the interactions with the macroeconomy; cf Leung (2004).
4One innovation in that work that is important to understand the interplay of accessibility and the demand for
public goods is to move away from the models with the traditional circular central city and donut shaped suburb.
Hanushek and Yilmaz (2007) consider a metropolitan area divided into two equal halves, say by a river down the
middle. All employment, however, remains in the center of the metropolitan area. The more common depiction of a
monocentric city has a circular central city surrounded by a donut shaped suburban ring; see de Bartolome and Ross
(2003) or Cassidy, Epple, and Romer (1989). In this traditional formulation, it is not possible to observe locations
with the same accessibility but diﬀerent school qualities. Note that our cities have some similar structure in that
there is ”ring-separation” of diﬀerent household types within each jurisdiction.
5A key element of the equilibrium is the heterogeneity of both income and tastes in both communities. Necessarily,
with four types of individuals, there must be mixing. But this solution shows that neither income groups nor tastes
groups form homogeneous communities. Moreover, if we make income and tastes perfectly correlated (as is implicit
in most theoretical investigation of locational choice), we still ﬁnd heterogeneity of income across communities (not
shown). The key is that the varied components of the decision making lead to trade-oﬀs in terms of accessibility and
4to characterize the continuum of school quality that is observed within virtually all metropolitan
areas in the United States. Second, it provides an inadequate basis for policy considerations –
speciﬁcally school ﬁnance policy here – where the key element is the heterogeneity of communities
and the behavioral responses of households to governmental changes in the spatial attractiveness
of individual jurisdictions.
Here we move to consideration of multiple workplace centers with three separate school districts.
Among other things, this exercise incorporates a fundamental empirical feature of today’s urban
landscape, i.e., the importance of suburbs and of their heterogeneity. In 1940, 32.8 percent of the
U.S. population lived in central cities of metropolitan areas, with less than half that many (15.8
percent) in suburban areas; by 2000, 30.3 percent lived in central cities while fully half of the U.S.
population was found in suburbs (Hobbs and Stoops 2002). Moreover, looking at a constant set of
metropolitan areas, Kim (2007) notes that central cities began declining absolutely in population
after 1950 as population density gradients ﬂattened signiﬁcantly. These changes in the spatial
structure of metropolitan areas paralleled the decentralization of business and industry. While
centralized employment and undiﬀerentiated suburban locations are convenient and tractable from
a modelling perspective, they lack realism in describing current metropolitan areas.
Decentralized employment models, which move away from imposing radial symmetry of loca-
tions, produce income and taste mixing within communities and clearly show the development
of competing (and heterogeneous) suburban jurisdictions. The fundamental model provides a
benchmark for subsequent policy experiments. Of particular importance here is the reaction of
households to common changes in the ﬁnancing rules for schools. Households have alternative
margins of adjustment to changed incentives, and the resulting equilibria are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
than predicted by traditional models.
Introducing the complexity of multiple employment centers and heterogeneous households comes
at a cost. First, analytical solutions of the models are impossible, and we must turn to calibrated
school quality. If we compare households of a given skill type and taste for education, we see that some are willing
to accept lower quality schools in order to gain better access to work and vice versa.
5general equilibrium solutions. Second, given this analytical approach, we must rely upon both
speciﬁc assumptions about key elements such as the utility functions of households and speciﬁc
parameterizations of utilities, transportation costs, and employment surfaces. As a result, while
we can readily illustrate the qualitative importance of considering a richer formulation of household
behavior, uncertainty remains about how to generalize the results to any real policy deliberation.
Generalizing the policy conclusions will require an expanded set of underlying formulations and
parameter speciﬁcations.
3 Formal Model of Household Decisionmaking
The outline of our structure is easy to describe. Urban location and public good preferences
are integrated with a calibrated general equilibrium model of community choice. Households that
diﬀer in both income and tastes commute to their workplaces, facing both pecuniary and time costs
in commuting. There are decentralized employment centers (a central city and two subcenters) and
three local school districts. Education, the sole public good, is provided through local schools
and is ﬁnanced through property taxes determined by majority voting. The production function
for education models quality as a combination of peer group eﬀects and spending. Both location
and school quality aﬀect housing prices, and thus both inﬂuence taxes and mobility. Households
maximize utility through choice of workplace, residential location, and housing and in equilibrium
have no incentive to move to an alternate jurisdiction.
The primary innovation in our analysis is the introduction of more realistic decision prob-
lems for households that in turn provides a basis for analyzing how exogeneous policy changes
aﬀecting the attractiveness of diﬀerent locations impacts overall outcomes. Households choose
residential and job locations and housing quality based upon price, accessibility, and school quality
attributes. Speciﬁcally, individuals diﬀer in both tastes for schooling and in income and are moti-
vated in their locational decisions by wages available at diﬀerent employment centers, land prices,
commuting costs, and the tax price-quality bundle of schools. They also vote on school funding
(always with the option of voting with their feet if the collective decision is not satisfactory).
6Introducing these multiple decision margins permits calibrating the model to urban structures
closer to what we observe – multiple competing jurisdictions within a metropolitan area where
communities diﬀer in housing prices, school quality, and taxes and yet the populations of each are
heterogeneous in terms of income and underlying tastes. Having such a benchmark is particularly
important for policy simulations that mirror a variety of place-based proposals such as changing
the ﬁnancing of schools.
3.1 Location with Decentralized Employment
The starting point for our modelling is the prior empirical observation that some 60 percent of
population of metropolitan areas is found in multiple suburban jurisdictions, which in turn reﬂects
the movement of jobs to more decentralized urban locations.6 While it is possible to illustrate the
trade-oﬀs of accessibility and local amenities (here schools) in a model with centralized employment
(Hanushek and Yilmaz 2007), the limited variation between jurisdictions constrains the range of
policy interventions that can be realistically considered. We embed our analysis of household
locational decisions within a model of a metropolitan area with three employment centers and
three separate local school districts. This expansion from the more common central-city/suburban
split provides a richness of alternatives while still being analytically tractable.
We begin with a ﬂat featureless plane that has exogenously determined jurisdictions. As shown
in Map 1, the area has two suburban workplaces, namely the West Suburban Center (w) and the
East Suburban Center (e), as well as a Central City (cc). This jurisdictional structure permits
disentangling accessibility and school quality. This city is a stylized representation of the many
cities on water boundaries such as Chicago, Cleveland, or New Orleans.7
Firms are located at points, take up no space, and have no taxable property.8 Each
jurisdiction also contains a school district (named after its employment center).
6See, for example, the discussion of patterns of American cities in Glaeser and Kahn (2001, 2004). The incorpo-
ration of decentralized employment into urban modelling is explored in depth in White (1976, 1999).
7As Rose(1989) points out, half of the 40 most populous metropolitan areas were bound by the Paciﬁc Ocean,
Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, or the Great Lakes.
8Note that ignoring the impact of commercial and industrial property on the tax base ignores an important feature
of local ﬁnance (see Ladd (1975), Fischel (2006)), but it would not change the qualitative nature of our results.
7Map 1: City Map 
  
                                               y (North) 
 








                                     
                                                 
                                   
                             
                               
  
                                              
CBD 
West School District 





 — Map 1 about here —
An alternative might be a generalization of a monocentric city with a circular central
city surrounded by a donut shaped suburban rings. With this structure, the radial symmetry
permits straightforward analytical solutions of location where it is necessary only to trace locational
choices along any ray from the employment center. In its simplest form, it has also motivated a
large number of empirical analyses of urban form that are based on estimating household density
functions and price gradients emanating from the center (see, for example, Mills(1972), Rose(1989),
and Kim(2007)).
For our purposes, however, this circular structure is problematic. For analytical purposes,
all locations close to the employment center are served by a common school district, making it
diﬃcult to see the separate inﬂuences of location and school quality. Additionally, there are
empirical reasons to consider alternative depictions. The circular city is more of an analytical
convenience than a realistic portrayal of American cities. The variety of cities that result from
natural boundaries such as lakes, rivers, and mountains or from historical development patterns
makes the stylized ”von Thunen pattern” more a simplifying device than an accurate generalization
of city structures (see Rose 1989). Moreover, while it is possible to correct estimation of density
gradients for missing quadrants (see Mills(1972) or Rose(1989)), the simple depiction fails in a
signiﬁcant number of metropolitan areas.9
Labor market. We concentrate on residential and schooling choices and take wages as
exogenous. At each workplace (l), there are both high wage jobs (paid to skilled workers, s) and
low wage jobs (paid to unskilled workers, u) such that (wl
s >w l
u). (All skilled workers are perfectly
substitutable, as are all low wage workers). Wages of both skilled and unskilled workers vary across
suburban centers sub ∈{ w,e} depending on their locations relative to the Central City. Suburban




u ), because of the
9Kim(2007) describes a number of situations where the standard depiction does not work including, importantly,
the signiﬁcant numbers of U.S. metropolitan areas with multiple central cities or other anomalies. Bertaud and
Malpezzi (2003) also ﬁnd a number of international cities are inaccurately described by smooth density gradients.
8wage gradient induced by the lesser need to commute and the larger and cheaper houses around
these places.10
Households and preferences. One member of each household works and makes all the economic
decisions in the house. Each household has one pupil attending school, although the crucial element
is that all children in a household attend the same school district. Households place diﬀerent values
on the quality of education a jurisdiction provides. Some value education more (high valuation
types, H), some less (low valuation types, L). Therefore, we have four diﬀerent types of households
in the city i ∈{ S L ,S H ,U L ,U H }. The diﬀerent valuations could reﬂect diﬀerences in inherent
tastes or could be induced by underlying diﬀerences in family size. A low valuation household
may, for example, be a household with no children at home, but it nevertheless recognizes that
school quality is still relevant because it will be capitalized into rents and housing values. The
metropolitan area is closed in the sense that there is a set population of each of four types of
households. Since we have four types of households, three workplaces and three school districts,
there are 4 × 3 × 3 = 36 diﬀerent household-by-residence-by-workplace outcomes, although some
types may be absent in equilibrium.
The preferences for a type i household is represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function
given by U(αi,η i;q,s,z,t)=q
αi
j sηizγtδ, where αi + ηi + γ + δ =1 , qj is the quality of education
in community j∈{ cc,w,e}, s>0 is the lot size, z>0 is the numeraire composite commodity,
and t ∈ [0,24] is leisure. αi ∈{ αH,α L} is the taste parameter for education and, ηi ∈{ ηH,
ηL} is the taste parameter for lot size. The normalization of the parameters to sum to one is
done to diﬀerentiate high valuation and low valuation households with the same income. To see
this, consider two households, one low and one high valuation, with the same income. In this
formulation, a high valuation type enjoys education (lot size) more (less) than a low valuation type
(i.e. αH >α L and ηH <η L), and as will be shown later, a high valuation type prefers a higher
10In locational models, the wage gradient is frequently derived after the residential price gradient is found. A
complete model would, however, simultaneously solve both the household and employer locational problem along
with rents and wages – a task beyond our capacity. In our model with exogenous wages and employment, the rent
gradient adjusts to wages, because wages will enter into the value of accessibility.
9property tax rate (i.e., more school expenditure) than a low valuation type.
Accessibility and Budget Constraint. Consider a type i household who is trying to decide where
to work and live. The area has a dense radial transportation system from each workplace, and the
worker of every household commutes daily from his residence to his workplace. But a household
could have a residence diﬀering from his/her workplace. For instance, a household commuting to
his/her workplace in the cc, could reside in West School District due to a better education, tax
advantages, or less commuting distance. There is both a time and Euclidean distance component
to the commuting cost. Formally, commuting requires a/2 dollars per mile and b/2 hours per mile.
The time endowment for the household is 24 hours. The budget constraint of the household with
a workplace l and school district j, at a location (x,y) on the xy plane (i.e. on the map) is given by
zijl(x,y)+( 1+τj)R(x,y)sijl(x,y)+wl
itijl(x,y)=Y l
i (r)=2 4 wl
i − (a + bwl
i)r (1)
where r is the distance11 to workplace l, τj is the property tax rate, R(x,y) is the equilibrium
rent per unit of land at the coordinate (x,y) on the map, that is paid to a landlord for his land
in community j. Notice that this formulation suggests that households sell all available time to
employers and buy back some leisure at the prevailing market wage rate. The household’s problem
could be summarized by picking up a workplace, a school district and residential location (i.e.
(x,y) ∈ R2), a lot size, the amount of leisure, and the composite commodity simultaneously at
given prices.
Land Market. Following Alonso (1964), we assume a competitive land market in which house-
holds bid for land and absentee land owners oﬀer the land to the highest bidder. For any given
location, nondevelopment is an option and the land is left for agricultural use if the households
cannot outbid the agricultural use, which has a ﬁxed bid of ra.
In equilibrium, the advantages and disadvantages at diﬀerent workplaces and school dis-
tricts/locations are capitalized into prices. Identical households obtain the same utility level. The
bid-rent function captures this feature and allows us to calculate rents at diﬀerent locations/school
11r =

(x − xll)2 +( y − yll)2,w h e r e( xll,y ll) is the location of the workplace l on the map. Note that the set of
locations with the same distance to workplace l is a circle.
10districts. In a standard way, we can deﬁne the bid-rent function of the household, which shows the























First, consider households with, say, workplace l and school district j. The relative steepness
of bid-rent functions for diﬀerent types by distance determines the spatial ordering of household
locations (rings) around the employment center. Our model relies on the single crossing of bid-rent
functions that needs to be conﬁrmed.13 We ﬁnd that poor (high valuation) households have a
steeper bid-rent curve than rich (low valuation) households, and the spatial ordering of households
turns out to be Unskilled High, Unskilled Low, Skilled High and Skilled Low, as we move away from
the employment center. See the appendix for a detailed discussion. If we compare households with a
workplace l in each school district, we expect to see the bid-rent levels and the ring sizes are altered
due to quality of education and tax package diﬀerences as well as taste for education diﬀerences,
but the ordering of household types remains the same. The implication is that households with
workplace l occupy rings around the employment center, but those rings have a diﬀerent radius as
we move to another school district. See the picture at the end of appendix. In school district j, we
have three diﬀerent ring sets originating from three employment centers. Therefore, at any given
location in school district j, the landlord receives 4*3 + 1 =13 implicit oﬀers corresponding to the
four diﬀerent types of households with three possible diﬀerent workplaces, and agricultural use.
The highest bid gets the land. As we move away from a center, bid-rent curves go down. Since the





13Numerically, we show that for any pair of bid-rent functions originating from workplace l, one of them is always
steeper (larger slope in absolute value) than the other at any intersection point. Since bid-rent functions are con-
tinuous, it must be the case that they intersect once, and one of them is steeper than the other one. It also implies
households are segregated by distance, and identical household types locate in rings around the employment center.
See Fujita (1999). Moreover, at the intersection point, the relative slopes are independent of quality of education/tax
packages. i.e. the spatial order is valid in any school district.
11highest bid gets the land, a location closer to an employment center is more likely to be occupied
by a households with a job in that employment center.
We can identify the equilibrium location (both residential and workplace) of households
and equilibrium market rents in our closed city, once we know the households’ utilities. Market
rent, R(x,y) is the upper envelope of the equilibrium bid-rent curves Ψi(j,l,r,u∗
i,.) for all household
types i ∈{ SL, SH, UL, UH}, all workplaces j ∈{ cc, w, e}, and the agricultural rent line. Needless
to say, in equilibrium, if type i households are present in more than one jurisdiction, they should
get the same utility wherever they are so that nobody has an incentive to switch workplace, school
district/location, or consumption pattern
Taxes and schools. Our real interest is to examine the interaction of school quality and location.
For most interesting analysis, we must turn to a full general equilibrium model.
From a household’s point of view, each jurisdiction is characterized by the quality of ed-
ucation and property tax rate pair (qj,τ j) it provides. Education in community j ∈{ cc,w,e} is
ﬁnanced through property taxes on residential land. Each jurisdiction’s local government spends
all tax revenue on education. Then, the government budget constraint in school district j is







where Nj is the population, Ej is the expenditure per pupil, and ¯ Rj is the tax base per pupil in
school district j. Note that the agricultural land does not pay any property taxes (i.e. integration
over R(x,y) >r a).14
Characterizing the relationship between the quality of education and the expenditure on
schools has proven diﬃcult (Hanushek 2003). Here, we emphasize the interaction of peers and










H are the number of low educational valuation and high educational
14When the land is left for agriculture in equilibrium, R(x,y)=ra.
12valuation households in school district j, respectively.15 The peer group eﬀect function, φj(·),













where c1,c 2, and c3 > 0 are constants. Notice that φj, the eﬃciency of schools in jurisdiction
j, is increasing in high valuation households and decreasing in low valuation households. The value
of peer group eﬀect is between c1 and c1 + c2. Two arguments can be made to justify this kind
of peer group eﬀect. The ﬁrst argument is based on the classical peer-group eﬀect: the more my
neighbor knows, the more I can learn from him. The second argument is that high valuation
households are more involved in how schools operate such as taking a part in the schooling process
as board members or simply continuously watching over school decisions. This involvement is
presumed to lead to a more eﬃcient use of resources.
The property taxes are determined by majority voting in each school district. Following
Epple et al. (1983, 1984, 1993), we assume that voters are myopic in the sense that they do not
consider that their decision about (qj,τ j) will inﬂuence land prices, populations, eﬃciency of the
schooling system, etc.16 Their vote will reﬂect their tax preferences (τj) that come from maximizing









i (r)ηi+γ+δ subject to qj = φj(.)Ej (7)
Ej = τj ¯ Rj
Solving this problem yields the preferred tax rate for type i household with a workplace l
and residence at (x,y), ˜ τi = αi
ηi−αi. 17 The preferred tax rate is a direct function of the household’s
valuation of the importance of schooling. Since there are only two valuation types for households,
there are two possible preferred tax rates in the economy, and high valuation types have a higher
15This structure would produce qualitatively similar results if the peer eﬀects depended on the relative concentra-
tions of the diﬀerent income groups.
16For a model of voters with perceptions of capitalization and capital gains, see Yinger (1982, 1985).
17It is implicitly assumed ηi >α i. This assumption also guarantees the single peaked preference requirement for
the existence of majority voting equilibrium.
13preferred tax rate (˜ τSH > ˜ τSL and ˜ τUH > ˜ τUL). Also, the more they value housing and spend on
it (higher η), the lower the property tax rate they prefer.
Timing of Decisions. The timing of events would be as follows: At the beginning of each
period, households make workplace and school district/location decisions with the expectation that
the last period’s education and property tax packages would prevail in the current period. Once
they move in, they are stuck. They vote for the property tax rate in their school district of residence.
The public good and tax rate package might be diﬀerent from what they expected, but they have
chosen the community for that period. At the beginning of the next period, they update their
expectations and events start over again. In analyzing this model, we impose a requirement that
all local governments budget are balanced. Equilibrium occurs when, regardless of their workplace
or residential location or school district, households of the same type attain the same utility level
regardless of residence (i.e. a type i household gets u∗
i everywhere).
Deﬁnition. An equilibrium is a set of utility levels, quality of education and property tax rate for
each school district, the spatial distribution of households over workplaces and school districts such
that:
• Given prices, households pick a workplace, a school district, a location, lot size, leisure, and
composite commodity to maximize their utility.
• Diﬀerent household types in three employment centers bid for each location. The land at
a location is developed for the highest bidder if the highest bid exceeds the ﬁxed non-urban
purpose bid, agricultural rent. Otherwise, it is not developed.
• The city is a polycentric city, and jobs are oﬀered by ﬁrms located at the CC or two sub-
centers. Wages in the workplaces are exogenously determined. The city has a dense radial
transportation system around workplaces. Households commute to workplaces. Commuting
has both pecuniary and time costs.
• We have identical treatment of identical households. Regardless of their residential location,
14Parameter Value Parameter Value
αH 0.019 ηH 0.048
αL 0.016 ηL 0.051
γ 0.187 δ 0.747










Table 1: Calibration Parameters
workplace or school district, households of the same type attain the same utility level.
• The metropolitan area is a closed city and contains three school districts, each of which oper-
ates its own schools. Moreover, land is owned by absentee landlords.
• The local public good, education, is produced through a production function deﬁned by peer
characteristics and school spending, where spending is ﬁnanced through local property taxes
on residential land as determined by majority voting in each school district.
• Labor and land markets clear.
• The local government budget balances in school districts.
3.1.1 Calibration
The central parameter values for the functional forms used in the model follow those displayed
in Table 1.
These parameters relate the equilibrium choices of households to relevant aggregate statis-




ηH+γ+δ,a n d δ
ηH+γ+δ percent of his net income
Y (r) on land, the composite commodity, and leisure, respectively.18 U.S. average weekly hours of
persons working full time are about 40 hours19, and the average annual earnings (for individuals
18-years old or more) is $22,154 for high school educated workers and $38,112 for college graduate
workers in 1997. These ﬁgures suggest the hourly wages in the CC for unskilled and skilled workers
18For the calculations we begin with the skilled, high valuation type (SH).
19The statistical facts, unless otherwise indicated, come from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1998.
15should be calibrated as wu ≈ $10.70/hour and ws ≈ $18.30/hour, respectively. The wages at the
suburban center are lower so that a higher fraction of jobs are located at the CC (46.7%).20 The
share of leisure (nonwork time) in the household’s budget is δ
ηH+γ+δ =1− 40ws
24×7×ws ≈ 0.762. The
data on average annual expenditures of some selected MSAs suggest that a household spends about
20 percent of his income on shelter. Therefore, we set the budget share of composite commodity
and land as
γ
ηH+γ+δ =( 1− 0.762) × 0.8 ≈ 0.1904 and
ηH
ηH+γ+δ =( 1− 0.762) × 0.2 ≈ 0.0476,
respectively. Recall that the preferred tax rate for a type i household is given by ˜ τi = αi
ηi−αi and
we had two possible preferred tax rates, one for high valuation and another for low valuation type
households. The one for high (low) valuation type is set to be about 1.7 percent (1.1 percent), out
of the value of a house, which is the present value of rents generated by the house annually. These
relationships provide suﬃcient information by which to calibrate αH,α L,η H,η L,γ ,δ .
Since the most common practise of commuting in the U.S. is by car, pecuniary commuting
cost per round trip mile is based on the cost of owning and operating an automobile. In 1997,
pecuniary cost per mile was 53.08 cents, suggesting a pecuniary commuting cost of a =$ 1 .1p e r
round trip mile. Assuming the commuting speed is 20 miles per hour within the city, the time cost
of commuting per round trip mile is set to be b =0 .1 hours per mile.
The population of the city is set to be 3,000,000 households, which implies approximately
a population density of 5,185 households per square mile.21 Approximately, 40 percent of the total
population is assumed to be skilled worker households. Moreover, 30 percent of skilled households
are assumed to be low valuation types. For the unskilled households, 70 percent are assumed to be
low valuation types. The agricultural rent bid ra is set to be $8,897 per acre per year.22
The metropolitan area is large, and we have a inelastic supply of residential property in
20Ihlandfeldt (1992) reports that wages decline by approximately one percent per mile of distance from the CBD.
Here we consider distance from the central city employment center.
21The median population per square mile of cities with 200,000 or more population was 3,546 in 1992. Source:
County and City Data Book, 1994.
22Parameters of the education production function are set to be c1 =5 .819,c 2 =3 .975,c 3 =0 .461, so that
(qj,τ j) preferences of households in diﬀerent jurisdictions are consistent with (qj,τ j) pairs that induce the underlying
population distribution. With these parameter values for peers, a school district of all residents with low (high)
valuation has a productivity of 5.819 (9.794), a 68 percent diﬀerence in productivity for the higher peer group.
16Variable CC West East
Quality of Education 40.1 59.9 29.9
Tax rate 1.3% 1.66% 1.3%
Expenditure per pupil per year $1,968 $2,273 $1,876
Eﬃciency 7.43 9.63 5.82
Average monthly gross rent per acre $3,815 $4,054 $3,399
Table 2: The characteristics of communities in equilibrium.
any direction in the metropolitan area. For calibration, we divide the metropolitan area into ﬁne
grids (i.e. ﬁne two dimensional squares) and ﬁnd the residential location pattern over those grids.
Usually, in a monocentric city set up, polar coordinates are preferred because of radial symmetry.
Due to the interaction of concentric rings originating from three employment centers, the symmetry
is broken, and we use a cartesian coordinate system. The cost is the evaluation of double integrals,
as opposed to one dimensional integrals in polar coordinates. In a rich set up with decentralized
workplaces, it is not possible to talk about the uniqueness of equilibrium analytically. We rely on
computational methods to ﬁnd all equilibria.23
3.1.2 Basic Results with Decentralized Employment
The simulation results for the benchmark model are given in Table 2, Table 3, and Figures 2
and 3. In the base model, the West School District is the best in terms of the education it
provides, while the East is the worst. The West School District attracts mostly high valuation type
households. These high valuation households put more pressure on the schools and make schools
more productive and eﬃcient. The East School District is the opposite, attracting households with
a low valuation of education and resulting in low quality schools. The majority voting outcome
of tax rates in West (East) School district are the preferred tax rates of high (low) valuation type
households. To be precise, tax rates for the West and both the East and CC School Districts are
1.66 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively. Average rents attain their peak value in the West School
District and their lowest value in the East.
23See the appendix for computational details. With benchmark parameters, we identiﬁed two more equilibria. We
report the one with the highest welfare due to space considerations. The discussions and ﬁndings for the benchmark
model remain valid for the other equilibria as well.






















Figure 2: ISO-RENT CURVES: Iso-rent curves have been shown. Notice the rings around the CC
extending to West and East School Districts. These are in-commuters. Also see the jump in rents
around the school district borders where in-commuters live. This is due to eﬃciency/quality of
education diﬀerence between districts. The rent is the gross rent (i.e. (1 + τj)R(x,y)) per acre per
day.
The ﬁnding seems to be counterintuitive. After all, the east suburban center oﬀers higher
wages than west suburban center, and higher wages are expected to be capitalized into housing
prices. However, the quality of education is also capitalized into housing prices. As a matter of
fact, what we see is the better education in the west school district being directly capitalized into
housing prices. Moreover, the West School District with the highest property taxes and land prices
spends more on education than the other communities in the metropolitan area.
Figure 2 shows iso-rent curves for the metropolitan area. As sites get close to employment
centers, we observe a monotonic increase in rents with three local maxima around workplaces. More
importantly, we see the capitalization of higher quality of education and higher wages. The rents
are higher in the West School District with the best education, compared to the East School District
with the worst education. The West School District also provides a much better education than
the CC but their rents are almost the same, reﬂecting the higher wages and greater employment
accessibility in the central city.
The iso-rent rings around the CC center extend to both the West and East School districts,
reﬂecting the presence of in-commuters. The rings around CC center in the west school district
18Type/Workplace Residence
CC West East All
Skilled Low:CC 3.6 1.2 4.8
Skilled High:CC 10.4 6.3 0.3 17
Unskilled Low:CC 19.6 0.5 20.1
Unskilled High:CC 1.5 3.2 4.7
Skilled Low:West
Skilled High:West 6.3 6.3
Unskilled Low:West 2.6 1.0 3.6
Unskilled High:West 11.1 11.1
Skilled Low:East 7.3 7.3
Skilled High:East 4.4 0.2 4.6
Unskilled Low:East 0.6 17.8 18.4
Unskilled High:East 2.1 2.1
35.1 36.6 28.3 100
Table 3: Equilibrium percentage distribution of households across communities.
are diﬀerent from those in the CC school district. Although households in both rings have got a
job at the CC center, we see the capitalization of better education and tax package in the west
school district. For in-commuters, the rents at locations the same distance to the CC employment
are highest in the West School District and lowest in the East. There are big jumps in rents as we
cross into west school district from the CC school district. We also see the rings around the East
employment center extending to the West School District, showing the presence of households with
a job at the East employment center residing in the West School District, again to enjoy a better
education.
In equilibrium, all poor households with their steeper bid-rent curves locate closer to their
workplaces than rich households with ﬂatter bid-rent curves; within each skill group, high valuation
households locate closer to the workplace than low valuation households. As a result, households
of each type form a concentric ring, or zone, around the workplaces, and zones for all household
types are ranked by the distance from the workplaces in the order of steepness of their bid rent
functions. No agricultural land should be left inside the urban fringe. At the locations in between
workplaces, we see the interference of concentric rings around workplaces.

















Figure 3: ISO-LOT SIZE CURVES: Iso-lot size curves have been shown. The pattern is quite
similar to that of iso-rent curves.
Although the central city oﬀers 46.6 percent of all jobs available, a much smaller fraction
of households, 35.1 percent, resides in the CC in equilibrium (Table 3). The east suburban center
(32.4%) oﬀers more jobs than west suburban center (20.7%). The west suburban center can be
thought of as a bedroom community with employment concentrated in services for the population.
Besides, high valuation households disproportionately reside in the West School district that pro-
vides the best education while commuting to work in the CC (6.3% + 3.2% = 9.5%). Also, there
are some households (2 percent) with a job in the CC and residence at the East School district.
We do not see any out-commuters (i.e. residents of the CC getting to and from their workplace at
any suburban employment center). Also, note the presence of some households with a workplace at
East (West) and residence at West (East), either to commute less or to provide a better education
to their children.
Iso-lot size curves are drawn in Figure 3. The pattern is quite similar to iso-rent curves,
and similar arguments can be made. The lot sizes increase monotonically with distance from
employment centers and have local troughs at workplaces. Consistent with empirical evidence
in the U.S., the rich reside in bigger houses away from their workplaces. Once again, we clearly
see two eﬀects: Holding distance to workplaces constant, houses in the West School District are
smaller than houses in the East and CC School Districts. This is due to higher rents resulting
20from the capitalization of better education. Also, observe the rings around the CC extending to
the West and East School Districts. In the west, households with a job in the CC accept having a
smaller house and/or commute more to provide their children with a better education. Residential
densities follow a pattern analogous to rents.
Finally, the benchmark results vividly demonstrate the utility of moving to the multi-district
model with decentralized employment. The two suburban areas not only serve very heterogeneous
populations but also have very diﬀerent patterns of school quality and taxes. In fact, the East
district provides the worst schools in the area, but this is compensated for by having the lowest
rents.
4 Alternative School Finance Policies
Since the late 1960s and the California court case of Serrano v. Priest, courts and legislatures
have been concerned with potential inequities in the provision of schooling arising from the diﬀeren-
tial ability of some districts to raise funds for schools. The focus has been the use of local property
taxes to fund schools. The central argument is that diﬀerences in the tax base between wealthy
and poor districts result in ”discrimination on the basis of the wealth of ones’ neighborhoods,”
because wealthy districts could more easily raise funds for schools (Coons, Clune, and Sugarman
(1970)). Any such funding discrepancies would then lead to poorer schools and lower educational
outcomes for poor children. The history of school ﬁnance discussions throughout this period in-
volves the interaction of courts and legislatures to move the funding of schools away from local
property taxes to some alternative revenue plan (see Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1999), Fischel
(2006), and Hanushek and Lindseth (2009)).
The school ﬁnance debate is motivated by student achievement but most attention in
both the courts and in legislatures has quickly moved from achievement to policies focusing on
revenues and expenditures for local districts. The policy discussion is often framed by an implicit
assumption that income, property tax base, and school outcomes are very highly correlated across
21school districts such that poor people – who buy less housing – necessarily live in jurisdictions
with a lower property tax base and end up with poorer schools.24 What is generally missing is an
understanding of the equilibrium nature of residential decisions and the resulting patterns of school
outcomes – just the focus of the analysis developed here. Similarly, it is virtually never discussed
in the policy debates that, if the method of funding the schools is altered, the choices of households
will also shift, leading to a diﬀerent pattern of locational and distribution of schooling outcomes.25
The prior models frame the issues well. First, we see that incomes and school outcomes are
not perfectly related because households, even with the same income and tastes, are balancing
diﬀerent outcomes that are modelled simply here by valuing both school outcomes and access to
employment. Thus, some households who highly value schools will optimally live in districts with
low quality schools. Others who place a low value on schools are quite happy to live in a district
that has low tax rates and low value of housing, allowing them to consume better bundles of access
and housing. Second, houses of the same size and employment access command diﬀerent rents
when school quality is capitalized into the value.26 As a result, the property tax base is endogenous,
depending on the equilibrium choices of households. In particular, some households willingly pay
more for any speciﬁc quality of housing than they would need to in order to buy better schools.
In each of these cases, not only the interpretation of equity but also the implications for
educational outcomes and individual well-being become more interesting and more realistic. Ad-
ditionally, because of the reaction of households to changed opportunities, the results of alterations
in funding of schools are not easily predicted from partial equilibrium analyses that assume no
adjustments by households. Simply put, policies that explicitly favor districts with concentrations
of poor people may or may not lead to better outcomes for poor families.
This section analyzes a series of alternative school ﬁnance policies, representing variants of
24Another element that leads to diﬀerences in property tax bases but that does not reﬂect individual incomes is
the presence of commercial and industrial property, which can be taxed to pay for local schools (see Ladd 1975). Of
course, the way that these interact with households and schools depends upon the equilibrium choices of households
(Fischel 2006).
25See Hoxby (2001), Fischel (2006).
26The capitalization of school quality and other locational amenities is well-documented in Oates (1969), Black
(1999), Weimer and Wolkoﬀ (2001), and Gibbons and Machin (2008).
22policies that have been discussed or implemented in the recent period of school funding. We start
with district power equalization, an alternative funding plan that compensates districts that have
a low tax base. Subsequently, we consider full state funding, which in our simpliﬁed metropolitan
area is ﬁscally equivalent to district consolidation.
4.1 District Power Equalization
When households in diﬀerent school districts can choose the amount spent on schools, they
tend to sort into communities with concentrations of households having similar demands – just as
suggested by Tiebout (1956) – and spending will vary across districts. In the models here, these
decisions are ampliﬁed by peer inﬂuences on the eﬃciency of school spending and thus on school
quality. An alternative approach to purely local property taxes is district power equalization.27 A
portion of the funding in many states is based on a version of this. The central idea is a variable
matching grant from the state that equalizes the per student revenue yield across varying tax bases
for any property tax rate chosen by the district. It explicitly does not call for equal spending among
districts, only that all districts are able to realize the same revenues from the same tax eﬀort. (Note
that this is not the case in the benchmark, where the CC and the East districts apply the same tax
rate but collect varying revenues because the capitalization of school quality and location yields
varying tax bases). As is well known, however, the implications for spending patterns depend
centrally on the behavior of households in setting taxes and choosing locations and in general these
choices will yield spending that is correlated with wealth(see, for example, Feldstein (1975)).
Table 4 shows the equilibrium outcome of a move to ﬁnance through district power equal-
ization. With revenue and spending choices under district power equalization, the West district
again disproportionately attracts people who value schooling highly, but the largest impact is a
signiﬁcant fall in quality in the CC schools. The West School District is the most eﬃcient school
district, since it is home mostly to high valuation households. We also see the eﬀect of access and
27This was introduced into the debates by Coons, Clune and Sugarman (1970) and has been a perennial candidate
for funding, largely because it was identiﬁed as being ”wealth neutral.” It is variously called guaranteed tax base,
district power equalization, or wealth neutrality.
23Variable CBD West East
Quality of Education 31.8 58 37.3
Tax rate 1.3% 1.66% 1.3%
Expenditure per pupil per year $1,957 $2,186 $1,993
Eﬃciency 5.93 9.68 6.83
Average monthly gross rent per acre $3,675 $4,044 $3,543
Table 4: Equilibrium characteristics of communities after district power equalization.
Average School Quality
Benchmark Power Equalization
Skilled Residents 46.2 44.5
Unskilled Residents 43.3 42.2
High Valuation Families 54.4 52.4
Low Valuation Families 36.0 35.2
Table 5: School quality with power equalization.
wages on rents. Rents in the East remain below those in the CC, even though the tax rates and
school quality are essentially the same.
If we look at the comparisons of school quality in Table 5, we see that the implications
for diﬀerent types of households is not as simple as prior analyses have suggested. In the simple
partial equilibrium setting that motivates much of the discussion of school ﬁnance policy, equalizing
the ability to raise money is typically seen as a way of improving the education of kids from poor
families. But, as the table shows, the average quality of schools for the unskilled residents falls –
as it does for all family types. The range of schooling outcomes across household types narrows
but only slightly.
The most severely hit group is Skilled High valuation households (who have to share part
of the capitalized rents from high school quality with other groups). Nonetheless, each group
ﬁnds that the pre-policy equilibrium yielded better schools. There is a slight narrowing of the
gap between low income (unskilled) and high income (skilled) families, but it comes as the cost of
poorer outcomes overall.
As Feldstein (1975) previously indicated, this program does not sever the relationship be-
tween a community’s expenditure per pupil and its wealth (here measured by rents). Communities
24with the same property tax rates, as in our simulation, might end up with diﬀerent quality of
schools, and tax rates also vary by wealth.
4.2 Full State Funding
One obvious way to reduce the variation in spending (the objective of many court and legislative
decisions) is simply to raise the share of spending that is provided by the state. This is precisely
the history of school funding, as the state share of educational funding has gone from 30 percent
in 1940 to 40 percent in 1970 to 50 percent in 2000 (U.S. Department of Education 2008).28
The extreme is full state funding, where all local choice in funding decisions is eliminated.
A close relative of full state funding is school district consolidation where taxes and spending are
equalized across merging districts.29
The two policies are conceptually somewhat diﬀerent. Full state funding can still work with
separate school districts that make their own educational decisions, while consolidation assumes
both common funding and common administration. Additionally, consolidation does not have to
be done at the state level but instead can be done at lower levels such as the county-wide school
districts seen in many southern states. Nonetheless, in our metropolitan area analysis we do
not distinguish between full state funding and local consolidation. While there has been prior
analysis of district consolidation, the implications both for welfare and for school quality remain
uncertain.30
This section ﬁrst explores the consequences of school district consolidation. The CC, West,
and East School Districts are consolidated under the name, Greater City School District. For
28Note that the federal government currently provides 9 percent of total revenues (U.S. Department of Education
2008). These revenues are largely distributed in a compensatory manner that will provide larger funding to districts
with more poor people. Thus, even with a ﬂat amount of full state funding there would be variation across districts.
States, however, also have compensatory programs that would amplify such variations.
Because the federal share has increased since the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,
the local share of funding has fallen by even more than the rise in state shares.
29In fact, the history of U.S. schooling in the 20th century was one of consolidation of districts. At the beginning
of World War II, there were over 115,000 school districts, but this fell to less than 15,000 today.
30The nature of voluntary consolidation (Brasington 1999) and the potential cost savings from school district
consolidation (Duncombe and Yinger, 2002) have been previously considered. Calabrese, Cassidy, and Epple (2002)
analyze consolidation within the context of a political model and suggest that voters as a group are unlikely to
support further consolidation, although they suggest the welfare aspects of consolidation are ambiguous.
25Variable CC West East
Quality of Education 51.1 31 34.7
Tax rate 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%
Expenditure per pupil per year $1,936 $1,936 $1,936
Eﬃciency 9.63 5.84 6.55
Average monthly gross rent per acre $4,046 $3,439 $3,516
Table 6: The characteristics of communities after school district consolidation.
consolidation, however, we require that students attend their neighborhood schools, which follow
the boundaries of the prior school districts. Thus, consolidation and full state funding are both
modelled as a policy of common spending and tax policy across all of the neighborhoods/districts.31
This imposition of common spending does not, however, imply that outcomes are the
same. The metropolitan area moves from the benchmark to a new equilibrium, which is described
by Tables 6, and 7, and Figure 4. One striking feature of the new equilibrium is that, although all
jurisdictions spend the same amount of money on education, they end up with providing diﬀerent
qualities of education. In a signiﬁcant change from the prior benchmark, the CC School district
oﬀers the best education, while the West School District is the worst. What has happened?
Consolidation eliminates the ability of residents to choose the tax-spending policy that
they prefer, thus implicitly elevating the role of workplace accessibility in their decision making.
The property tax rate prevailing at equilibrium is, not surprisingly, the preferred tax rate of low
valuation households who represent the majority of households. The driving force in the school
outcomes is the impact of peers on schooling outcomes, and high valuation families systematically
move together to the more accessible CC district (see Table 7).
We also see the capitalization of better education into rents in Figure 4. The rents drop
as we cross the school district boundary between CC and west school district, where in-commuters
live.
31District consolidation with a common decision structure across all schools in the consolidated district may, for
example, employ compensatory schemes to re-direct funds to one or more of the prior (pre-consolidated) districts or
it could pursue various ”compensatory” assignment policies within the consolidated districts. We do not look at
these potential within-district policies.



















Figure 4: ISO-RENT CURVES: Iso-rent curves after School district consolidation have been shown.
The overall residential population of the CC increases, since the CC now also oﬀers the
best education in addition to oﬀering higher wages than other workplaces in the metropolitan
area. We do not see any signiﬁcant change in worker/resident population in the East. The major
worker/resident movement to CC comes from West. The exclusive bedroom suburb no longer oﬀers
the advantages that it did previously when local choice entered into spending decisions. Even so,
we still do not have perfect stratiﬁcation by incomes or tastes.
It is now useful to put this policy change into perspective. Table 8 again investigates
directly what has happened to the school quality across the diﬀerent groups of the population.
Similar to district power equalization, there is a reduction in the outcome gap by income, but
it follows from dramatic decreases in school quality. By attempting equalization, the full state
funding plan actually harms school quality.
4.3 Summary of Welfare Changes
The key to these calculations is that we have covered the most commonly advocated policies.
These are not the only approaches, but they are the most relevant.32 The results are striking.
32Two other potential policies complete the full range of options. First, the state or courts could simply declare
equal spending across districts. Second, the state could declare a common tax rate. Neither are entirely realistic
options because, with diﬀerences in the (capitalized) home values, these policies would not address the tax capacity
problem that has motivated much of the discussion to date.
27Residence Neighborhood/district
Type/workplace CC West East All
Skilled Low:CC 2.2% 0.7% 2.9%
Skilled High:CC 19.2% 1.2% 1.2% 21.6%
Unskilled Low:CC 3.3% 4.2% 0.3% 7.8%
Unskilled High:CC 17.9% 17.9%
Skilled Low:West 2.8% 2.8%
Skilled High:West 0.4% 0.4%
Unskilled Low:West 12.5% 1% 13.5%
Unskilled High:West
Skilled Low:East 1.8% 4.6% 6.4%
Skilled High:East 0.6% 5.4% 6%
Unskilled Low:East 3.1% 17.6% 20.7%
Unskilled High:East
40.4% 28.8% 30.8% 100%




Skilled Residents 46.2 41.7
Unskilled Residents 43.3 39.3
High Valuation Families 54.4 47.8
Low Valuation Families 36.0 33.9
Table 8: School quality with full state funding (district consolidation).
28First, paralleling the actions of legal cases surrounding school funding, spending and tax rates
are equalized as an objective measure of actions to improve the equity of the system. Second,
aggregating across the schools attended by the diﬀerent groups, we see more equality in educational
outcomes at the cost of lower the quality of schools for all groups. As seen in Table 5, the
consolidation or full state funding policies have their largest impacts on families with high valuation
of education. Previously, they tended to move to districts that had other high valuation families and
that tended to vote higher taxes to support their schools.33 The equalization inhibits expressing
preferences for education through choice of higher taxes, and they end up in lower quality schools.
Indeed, this looks like the results in California following the Serrano v. Priest court case. The
state largely took over funding of all schools, the level of funding of schools fell (compared to
other states), and schools dropped to near the bottom of state rankings on student achievement
(Hanushek and Lindseth 2009).
Table 9 summarizes the welfare change of households resulting from the previous policy
alternative. In Table 9 we provide a measure of the consumption change that is equivalent to the
utility change with the introduction of the policy. The impact of constrained choices of consolida-
tion on high valuation households (both skilled and unskilled) is the equivalent of a two percent
consumption loss. But even the unskilled, low valuation households are hurt, because rents are
driven up from the minimums previously available.34
Although we have ideal conditions for governmental involvement – the presence of peer
group eﬀects and the redistributive motives for the government to reduce spending disparities –
the welfare implications of the policies that are shown Table 9 are somewhat surprising. Due to
distortions that could only be captured by a general equilibrium framework, crippling the Tiebout
system by divorcing local property wealth (i.e. the price mechanism) from school spending results
Nonetheless, calculations of the new equilibrium under these policies yields the same qualitative answers as those
shown: Overall school quality declines, and there are welfare losses for each of the subgroups.
33Our previous analysis based on the classic monocentric employment model (Hanushek and Yilmaz 2007) also
found the consolidation led to generalized welfare losses.
34Table 9 provides an estimate of the consumption change required for constant utility. An alternative is to calculate
the change in rent needed to hold household utility constant after the introduction of the policy. This calculation
(not shown) yields the same qualitative conclusion
29Type Consolidation Power Equalization
Skilled High -0.52 -0.44
Skilled Low -0.48 -0.34
Unskilled High -0.58 -0.36
Unskilled Low -0.44 -0.41
Table 9: Equivalent consumption changes as a result of governmental involvement (Minus implies
losses).
Type/Commut. Cost a=1.1, b=0.1 a=1.375, b=0.075 a=0.825, b=0.125 a=1.375, b=0.125
Skilled High -0.52 -0.18 -0.35 -0.18
Skilled Low -0.48 -0.17 -0.36 -0.16
Unskilled High -0.58 -0.28 -0.33 -0.20
Unskilled Low -0.44 -0.18 -0.29 -0.12
Table 10: Welfare change after consolidation by the cost of commuting. a is the monetary cost in
dollars, and b is the time cost of commuting in hours.
in welfare losses for all households. The worst policy, in terms of welfare loss, is school district
consolidation, but district power equalization does surprisingly bad.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
The speciﬁc equilibrium outcome reported is clearly based upon speciﬁc choices of the functional
form and parameters for the key underlying utilities and costs. Without an analytical solution, we
cannot get away from this parameter dependency. As a way of assessing the generalizability of the
results, we consider varying two key sets of parameters: those related to the cost of commuting
and those related to importance of the speciﬁc taste parameters.
We start out with the cost of commuting. We consider a range of many simulations in which we
increase/decrease the time cost and pecuniary cost by 25%, and repeat school district consolidation
and district power equalization exercises. Due to space consideration, we just report welfare change
after school district consolidation from some simulations in Table 10. Note that the ﬁrst column
is the benchmark, and the reported ones are chosen to give a general picture of all simulations. In
almost all simulations, everybody is worse oﬀ. Though not reported here, average school quality
by income or taste groups reconﬁrms the previous ﬁndings. Everybody gets a lower quality school.
30Type/Taste αL=0.17, αH=0.19 αL=0.15, αH=0.17 αL=0.15, αH=0.19 αL=0.17, αH=0.21
Skilled High -0.52 -0.02 -0.93 -0.84
Skilled Low -0.48 -0.05 -0.91 -0.85
Unskilled High -0.58 -0.15 -0.48 -0.31
Unskilled Low -0.44 -0.04 -0.42 -0.30




































Figure 5: Iso-rent curves for the pure urban model have been shown.
As for power district equalization, we reconﬁrm our previous results. Everybody is worse oﬀ after
the policy is implemented, and all household income groups or taste groups get a lower quality of
education.
Table 11 shows welfare change after consolidation for diﬀerent taste values. Recall that taste
values determine the willingness to pay, the property tax rate. We have nothing new. Everybody is
worse oﬀ, and the quality of education for income groups by income or tastes is lower. For district
power equalization, the welfare change and average quality of education for household groups by
income or tastes is less robust.
One interesting case is to compare our benchmark to a pure urban model by removing the
Tiebout dimension to choice. We set property taxes to be zero and quality of educations as one.
Figure 5 shows the iso-rent curves for the pure urban model. Again, rents go down as we move
away from the employment centers. Around centers, we see the capitalization of wages. Wages are
highest (lowest) at the CC (west) subcenter. So are rents. We also see a more balanced distribution
31of population distribution. In the benchmark, we see more high valuation households in the school
district that provides the a better education. Moreover, we also see the capitalization of better
education. Though the east subcenter has higher wages than the west subcenter, the rents around
the west subcenter are higher due to a higher quality of education. These behaviors and equilibrium
outcomes are no longer present in the pure urban model. Finally, in the pure urban model, we do
not see any jumps or drops in rents as we cross the district border because there is no education
quality to be capitalized into housing prices.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a uniﬁed treatment of the two separated streams of literature, urban
location theory and Tiebout models of community choice. It also takes the model beyond the
monocentric city model by introducing decentralized employment locations. The base locational
outcomes are more consistent with empirical observation. As opposed to the prediction of Tiebout
models, where there is stratiﬁcation of households across communities by income, all communities
are heterogenous and contain all household types. Compared to monocentric models, the model
generates a realistic commuting pattern.
From an analytical viewpoint, it is clear that considering multiple jurisdictions with decen-
tralized employment opportunities is important. The competition among suburban districts, a
fact of today’s locational patterns, can only be handled with models such as those outlined here.
Additionally, when considering the kinds of signiﬁcant changes in school ﬁnance policies that have
occurred frequently for the past 50 years, it is extremely important to consider general equilibrium
formulations, because households will adjust to the changed attractiveness of diﬀerent locations in
a metropolitan area.
The richness of this depiction of household locational choices does, however, come at a cost.
We cannot be completely general but must rely upon ﬁxed speciﬁcations and selected values for
key parameters. There is no reason to believe that the results are artifacts of the speciﬁc choices,
32and a sensitivity analysis involving alternative values of key parameters yields similar results as the
baseline model. Nonetheless, conclusions about the generalizability of the policy simulations must
await further analyses.
We use the model to assess the impact of two central types of reforms in the pursuit of equity
in school ﬁnance on the quality of education and individual welfare. A signiﬁcant ﬁnding of our
paper is that households seem to be uniformly worse oﬀ as a result of governmental involvement. In
the baseline, communities establish diﬀerent levels of education and property taxes, and households
”vote with their feet” to choose the optimal bundle. The property tax essentially becomes a fee for
education and location.
When government policy intervenes, our baseline policy assessments suggest that house-
holds are not made better oﬀ. Simplistic assumptions based on perfect stratiﬁcation and no
reactions of households lead to policy proposals that are not welfare improving.
Moreover, with school district consolidation and power equalization programs, districts
have the same expenditure per pupil, yet end up providing diﬀerent levels of education. Improving
the ﬁscal capacity of schools may be a necessary requirement to improve outcomes, but clearly it is
not suﬃcient to achieve equity of educational opportunity. Operating on just the spending margin
does not make the situation better, even when one has speciﬁc distributional objectives.
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Some Equations used in the Algorithm:
The Bid-rent and lot size functions for a type i household with workplace l, school district































Our model relies on the single-crossing property of bid-rent functions that needs to
be conrmed. Consider two dierent households with workplace l, school district j, and bid-
rent functions 	1(l;j;r;u1;:) and 	2(l;j;r;u2;:). Let r stand for an intersection point (i.e.
	1(r;u1;:) = 	2(r;u2;:) for some (r;u1;u2)). We say 	1(:) is steeper than 	2(:) if the following
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Since bid-rent functions are continuous and decreasing in r, if 	1(:) is steeper than 	2(:),
then it must be the case that 	1(:) and 	2(:) intersects at most once. Moreover, the bid-rent
function of household 1 dominates that of Household 2 to the left of r (i.e. 	1(r;u1;:) > 	2(r;u2;:)
for all 0  r < r) and the latter dominates to the right of r (i.e. 	2(r;u2;:) > 	1(r;u1;:) for all
r > r and 	1(:) > 0). Note that the ratio has nothing to do with the quality of education and
property tax rate in school district j. I.e. the spatial order for the rings around workplace l is valid
in any school district.





I[type(x;y) = i]dxdy =  Ni (5)
where S(x,y) is lot size in equilibrium, I[type(x;y) = i] is the indicator function that takes
the value 1 if the occupant at (x,y) in equilibrium is type i household, 0 otherwise, and  Ni is the
exogenously given population for type i household (closed city model).ALGORITHM: 
 
The following algorithm is used to solve the models in the paper. Major points are 
highlighted. Also see the picture at the end. The school district j could be any district. If we 
know the bid-rent curve of a type i household with workplace l and school district j, then we 
can draw the bid-rent for that type in all districts, because identical households obtain the 
same level of utility. In the same way, we can calculate the bid rent in all districts for type i 
households with a workplace in the other two employment places.  
 
1.  Define model parameters and discretize the space. 
2.  By using equation 4 in this appendix, check if single crossing property holds and 
determine the spatial order of households. The ratio in equation 4 is always larger than 
1 for any  r
* and the spatial order happens to be Unskilled High, Unskilled Low, 
Skilled High, and Skilled Low from the workplace l.   
3.  Randomize the initial tax rate/quality of education package in each district. 
4.  1.   Initialize fringe distance, rf
*j. Find uSL
* by using equation 3 in the paper and the  
            fact that at rf
*j, the rent is ra. Use this information to calculate bid-rent and lot sizes  
           (equations 1&2) for Skilled Low valuation households with workplace l in all  
           districts. Also calculate bid-rent and lot sizes in all districts for Skilled Low   
           valuation households with a workplace in other employment centers. 
2.  The land area where agricultural use outbids Skilled Low valuations is determined 
from the bidding process.  
3.   1. Initialize rSHSL
*j. 
              2. Calculate the rent at rSHSL
*j by using the bid-rent function (equation 1) of  
                   Skilled  Low valuation households. Use this information to find uSH
* by using  
                   equation 3. Calculate bid-rent and lot sizes (equations 1 & 2) for Skilled High  
                   valuation households with workplace l in all districts. Also calculate bid-rent  
                   and lot sizes in all districts for Skilled High valuation households with a  
                   workplace in other employment centers. 
       3. Determine the land area that Skilled Low valuations outbid Skilled High  
           valuations. By using lot sizes, calculate the population of Skilled Low  
           valuations (equation 5).   
              4. If it is larger (smaller) than the target value, go back to 4.3.1 and increase  
                  (lower)  rSHSL
*j. if it is close to the target value, move to step 4.4. 
4.  The land occupied by Skilled Low valuations are determined from the bidding 
process. 
5.  1. Initialize rULSH
*j. 
             2. Calculate the rent at rULSH
*j by using the bid-rent function (equation 1) of  
                 Skilled High valuation households. Use this information to find uUL
* by using  
                 equation 3. Calculate bid-rent and lot sizes (equations 1 & 2) for Unskilled  
                 Low valuation households with workplace l in all districts. Also calculate bid- 
                 rent and lot sizes in all districts for Unskilled Low valuation households with a   
                 workplace in other employment centers. 
       3. Determine the land area that Skilled High valuations outbid Unskilled Low  
           valuations. By using lot sizes, calculate the population of Skilled High  
           valuations (equation 5).   
             4. If it is larger (smaller) than the target value, go back to 4.5.1 and increase   
                (lower) rULSH
*j. if it is close to the target value, move to step 4.6. 
6.  Land occupied by Skilled High valuations are determined from the bidding 
process. 7.  1. Initialize rUHUL
*j. 
             2. Calculate the rent at rUHUL
*j by using the bid-rent function (equation 1) of  
                 Unskilled  Low valuation households. Use this information to find uUH
* by  
                 using equation 3. Calculate bid-rent and lot sizes (equations 1 & 2) for  
                 Unskilled High valuation households with workplace l in all districts. Also  
                 calculate bid-rent and lot sizes in all districts for Unskilled High valuation  
                 households with a workplace in other employment centers. 
        3. Determine the land area that Unskilled Low valuations outbid Unskilled High  
            valuations. By using lot sizes, calculate the population of Unskilled Low  
            valuations (equation 5).   
              4. If it is larger (smaller) than the target value, go back to 4.7.1 and increase   
                 (lower) rUHUL
*j. if it is close to the target value, move to step 4.8. 
8.  Land occupied by Unskilled Low valuations are determined from the bidding 
process. 
9.   Determine the land area that Unskilled  High valuations outbid Unskilled low 
valuations. By using lot sizes, calculate the population of Unskilled High 
valuations (equation 5). 
      5.   If it is smaller is (larger) than the target value, go back to 4.1 and increase (lower) 
            rf
*j. if it is close to the target value, move to step 6. 
6.  Find majority winner property tax rates, tax bases, and quality of education in each  
      school district. 
7.  Go back to step 3 and update tax rate/education package. Stop if the current period tax 
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